The notion of 'liveability' has endured for over fifty years within policy discourses, shaping urban strategy and planning across the world. This Debates paper examines the current state of liveability discourse. Liveability is unpacked to consider the rhetorical work that it does to frame urban problems, select and order concepts, and build narratives that shape policy action. Liveability discourse has a dual role: it defines normative goals for a city and also reifies and demands particular forms of expert knowledge to justify and maintain its discursive power. This power is created by connecting the vague rhetoric of the 'liveable city' to expertise represented in liveability rankings and indicators.
Introduction
"People laugh, when they are stuck in hours of traffic congestion, about being the most liveable city. They laugh when they see that might be our slogan, but we are the fourth most unaffordable city to live in." (Goff, P. cited in New Zealand Herald 2016) This quote from the incumbent mayor of Auckland, New Zealand, captures the paradox of the 'liveable' city: for many people living there, it is not. Three years earlier, Auckland launched its first metropolitan strategic spatial plan and announced the goal of becoming the world's most liveable city, building on global rankings that awarded the third place to the city in 2012 (Mercer, 2012) . However, the rapid growth of a house price bubble and protracted political disputes over rapid transit investment undermined this goal (McArthur, 2017) , which the city abandoned in 2016. Why does liveability discourse persist in urban policy when, in practice, it is so difficult to achieve? Close observation of liveability discourse 'in action' while conducting doctoral research in Auckland between 2013-2016 prompted this line of inquiry.
Liveability discourse has shown extraordinary longevity within urban policy and research.
The term is ubiquitous and taken-for-granted within urban strategies and policy documents (Clarke and Cheshire 2018) and has spread beyond local and national policies to feature in guidance from international organisations including UN-Habitat, the OECD, and the World Bank (OECD 2014 , UN-Habitat 2008 , World Bank 1996 . Following the 2018 release of the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual rankings, widespread media coverage reflected their ongoing importance to city branding and perceptions of success. Movements in the rankings were publicly debated in Singapore (Varma 2018) , India (Khajuria 2018, Nair Figure 1 illustrates the growth in liveability's popularity in the news media 1 . There is growth in Oceania, Asia, and Africa and Europe since the mid-2000s, showing the most recent upsurge in the discourse's popularity. This paper focuses on the mobilisation and influence of the discourse across this period, building on the work of Ley (1990) and McCann (2007) .
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The continued spread of liveability discourse, despite three decades of academic critique and prominent policy failures, raises questions for debate: how has the discourse maintained its
power, and what results from this form of rhetoric and knowledge production? Alongside the discourse itself, ideas and concepts travel through international policy networks and knowledge flows (Legrand 2016) , so the intersection between discourse and knowledge production is taken as the point of departure in this inquiry. This approach illustrates the relationships between discourse and expert knowledge production and the dynamic processes of constructing and negotiating policy frames. These relationships, as we shall explore, are not unidirectional, as liveability discourses are themselves shaped by the market for urban expertise and demand for specific knowledge from policymakers. May (2017, p.6) warns of 'narrowly based futures and ideas of expertise' that undermine aims for democratic and inclusive urban development, calling for such imaginaries to be 'consigned to the bonfire of the vanities'. We consider whether liveability should be consigned to such a bonfire. If so, understanding how it builds discursive power can reveal opportunities to develop tactical counter-discourses (Schafran 2014 ) that reconnect policy narratives to urban livelihoods and the everyday experience of the city.
Over the past decade, adoption of liveability in urban discourse is most prominent in Australasia, Asia, and international development organisations. Definitions of liveability vary widely at different scales of governance. National policies are influenced by the imperative for cities attain the status of a 'global city', which looks to strategic competitors to define what a city requires to gain a comparative advantage, often including international airports, high-amenity urban environments, and rapid transit systems (Baker and Ruming 2015). [Insert Table 1 here]
Deconstructing liveability discourse: rhetorical work and policy framing
To understand how liveability operates as a discourse, and the types of action spurred, this paper examines the rhetorical work (Rein and Schön 2012) done, and resulting policy frames (Schön 1983 ) generated. Liveability discourse is deconstructed to show how it mobilises ideas and language to define particular frames for urban policy intervention. This paper focuses on the rhetorical work and framing effects of urban liveability across the past decade, seeking to build on the conclusions of McCann (2007) to explain the specific discursive power and persistence of liveability discourse.
Rhetorical work refers to the use of 'urban liveability' as a linguistic apparatus to define the frame for city's problems and objectives, and in turn, the scope for potential interventions (Jensen and Richardson 2005 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 knowledge, to measure the various tangible and intangible characteristics that qualify whether a city is 'liveable'. Liveability discourse and the knowledge that supports it presents a distinct and partial model of the world, which spurs specific forms of action (or inaction) by the state.
How do specific frames assert their dominance in policy discourses, and permeate the city through actual interventions? Callon et al. (2002, p.199) show the dynamics and temporality of the process that underpins the qualification of 'things'. The quality of a product -in this case, a city -is 'obtained at the end of a process of qualification, and all qualification aims to establish a constellation of characteristics, stabilised at least for a while, which is attached to the product and transform it temporarily.' In the following analysis, annual liveability rankings demonstrate the temporary stabilisation of a city's qualities, as they bring into focus specific characteristics of cities and their amenities, making them coherent with broader narratives and potential objects of policy interventions. This process is dynamic, since liveability is negotiated and re-articulated from year to year. Indices impose performative power by asserting a fixed, but temporary, definition of liveability to different cities (Callon, 2010) and by ranking them.
A dynamic concept of framing is essential to unpack these processes and reveal the power dynamics of knowledge production. These dynamics are central to understand why and how particular definitions of liveability have dominated policy discourses and resulting interventions. On the one hand, framing has to be recognised as a political process, since the assumed 'model of the world' and of 'model for action' is shaped by power and conflicts (Richardson and Jensen, 2003) . Given the multiple interpretations of liveability reflected in Liveability proffered a flexible vision of safety, security, economic prosperity, social flourishing and sustainability (Kaal 2011) . This discourse held promise, initially, to progress beyond simplistic economic or ecological models (Ley 1990) , and to trigger productive interactions with psychological research that examines the needs of individuals in cities (Walmsley 1988 Without detail on the means to achieve this through service provision, resource allocation, and political institutions, the discourse had limited value to frame specific interventions.
Several international organisations also adopted liveability discourse. For UN-Habitat and the World Bank, the concept related to each organisation's developmental focus: actions were identified in terms of poverty eradication, basic service provision, equal rights, health and access to finance. For the OECD, liveability discourse followed a similar narrative to nation states, focusing on the quality of infrastructure and green spaces to support economic prosperity and attract mobile capital, workers and visitors.
The meanings constructed by city governments prioritise aspirational objectives that resonate with a range of actors, but do not acknowledge that these outcomes are often in tension with each other. Vienna's plan asserted that 'the quality that renders Vienna so attractive is to be experienced by all -old and young, long-time residents and newcomers as well as visitors'
(City of Vienna 2014, p.13), without acknowledging that these groups may value urban qualities in different ways. As a frame for action, liveability does not acknowledge social and economic disparities in cities, and how these can be catered for through planning, service provision, and governance (Lloyd 2016). In addition, the positioning of liveability within urban planning and policy discourse carried an implicit assumption that liveability can be governed, or indeed delivered, through planning processes or public service provision. The scope and agency of local governments to deliver liveability can be limited by national policies in areas such as economic policy and income redistribution, housing, national security strategies and migration policies (Clark and Moonen 2017).
The apparent weakness of liveability as a discursive tool to making sense of human needs, is perhaps the same characteristic that enabled liveability discourse to permeate policy debates and influence, in various ways, urban policy for half a century. As with the 'smart' or 'sustainable city' (Rydin, 2012) , the vague terms act to coalesce the interests of various types of actors (Hatuka et al., 2018) . The recent iterations of liveability discourse outlined in Section 3 maintain the vague conceptualisation, providing claims that are not objectionable to any specific party. Since it is not clear what the implications are for planning, service provision and investment, the discourse has limited rhetorical power to compel action.
Through knowledge production and the work of experts, however, a very vague term can be given 'policy substance'. Indeed, liveability's lack of specificity left the discourse vulnerable to appropriation, in the manner of the 'policy primeval soup ' (Kingdon 1984) . In what follows, we explore how the selective process of naming and categorising operated by a sample of urban liveability indexes contributed to qualify and reify specific characteristics of the liveable city.
Selecting, naming and categorising
Liveability's discursive power can be understood in conjunction with expert knowledge production. Specifically, the way that frames and accompanying urban 'expertise' select and order specific concepts and phenomena. Since the term 'liveability' does not have a specific, agreed-upon meaning, knowledge producers that actively 'fill in' this concept do actively select and categorise phenomena. Indices and rankings have gained policy traction in recent years (Kitchin et al. 2015 , Robin et al. 2017 , Robin and Acuto, 2018 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 composite or average measures, they order the importance of different phenomena that they deem important for liveability. Aggregation of metrics subsequently conceals this and the complexity of a 'people-centred' approach articulated in liveability discourses is homogenised to a single, city level metric. These rankings emphasise and make visible, through quantification, the preferences and preoccupations of a relatively privileged class of urban dwellers (McCann, 2007) , masking inner-city disparities by aggregating information at the city level. [Insert Table 2 here]
The metrics summarised in Table 2 reflect the preferences of a specific class: well-educated, internationally-mobile individuals and families who placed a high priority on the quality of architecture and urban design, restaurants and entertainment, public safety, schools, and access to airports for international travel. Inequality or deprivation is not directly measured, and the use of average values overlooks the experiences of low-income or disadvantaged groups. This show how liveability gives legitimacy to the consumption preferences of a particular class (Ley 1990), translating it into policy goals. The notion that liveability can be meaningfully reflected through a global ranking implicitly assumes that the reader is globally mobile. If not, it is of little utility or even reassurance that a city is more 'liveable' than another.
The production of rankings by private sector consultancies and lifestyle media headquartered in North America and Europe may explain the bias toward an audience of internationallymobile consumers, with similar consumption preferences. As a result, the transformation of liveability aspirations into rankings or indices, as ways of knowing and quantification, gave a limited representation of a complex and variable subject. Liveability is a polyvocal concept, which, as previously highlighted, has supported its popularity but also made it 'up for grabs'. The influence of liveability on the framing and boundary-setting of policy interventions has taken two forms. Firstly, the discourse combined with New Public Management approaches to governance, necessitating specific metrics, supporting the rise of global liveability indexes.
These indices aligned neatly with competitiveness discourses: Bristow (2005) outlines how the pre-eminent conception of regional competitiveness equates to 'attractiveness', or the capacity of the region to compete with other places for mobile capital. Liveability is couched within these conceptions, as far as it creates amenities to attract high-skilled workers to improve local economic competitiveness. This approach places strategic emphasis on the ability of a region to attract and retain innovative firms, skilled labour, mobile investment and central and supranational government subsidies and funds, and an overriding focus on the pursuit and measurement of their success in doing so relative to other places. Secondly, the uptake of liveability in urban discourse shows that it was treated a 'matter of fact', instead of Liveability, as a vague concept legitimised by global rankings, concealed issues around equity and urban planning by displacing local knowledge and therefore eliminating possibilities for public deliberation on appropriate and desirable goals for cities. Indeed, the mobilisation of liveability discourse reflects the 'performances' of buzzwords highlighted by Vincent (2014) : generating matters of concern (rather than matters of fact), setting attractive goals, and forming unstable collectives. Buzzwords have no consistent meaning, but strong resonance and positive connotations with an audience. However, this power also explains why buzzwords become problematic. Liveability's resonance influenced discourse with such ease that it was not received critically enough at the outset, and throughout the processes of sense-making and selecting examined in the previous sections.
Liveability performed adeptly as a buzzword in urban discourse, but unfortunately, the intended goals of framing knowledge production and action to improve individual lives did not materialise. Indeed, in light of its poorly-defined goals, liveability was reduced to a generalised policy prescription to improve walkability, public space upgrades, cycle lanes, rapid transit, environmental remediation -fostered by global rankings and expert consultants that assert inter-city competition at the centre of their practice. These interventions are often beneficial, however, within a land-use and housing system that is inequitable, they had restricted potential to improve liveability in an inclusive and meaningful way, for all people. 
Dynamics of framing
Evaluation of the influence of urban liveability discourse(s) allows us to question its value at a time when governance actors at all scales face important challenges to ensure that urban areas meet the needs of current and future generations sustainably and inclusively (UN Habitat 2016). Elaborating these three dimensions of discursive framing suggests that liveability has had more influence because of the 'fuzzy' conceptualisation, giving legitimacy to other agendas, than direct interventions to improve quality of life for everyone living in the city. The dynamics of discursive framing show that liveability discourses evade the trade-offs and potential conflicts across populations that hold diverse preferences and needs, by eluding concrete definition and subtly concealing the trade-offs that must be negotiated as cities develop and change. Like other buzzwords such as resilience, sustainability and smart-ness, this conceptual 'fuzziness' allowed the liveability discourse to be taken up by a wide range of actors. Indeed, definitions and mobilisations of the term vary widely between urban planning professionals, local politicians, community actors, academics, research funding agencies, global actors and media sources. The widespread adoption of the 'fuzzy' concept enables an illusory consensus to form, which is politically useful as it avoids direct confrontations with voters or interest groups. Liveability discourse also allays possible tensions between the needs of current and future residents: existing residents are assured that quality of life is prioritised, while liveability also operates as a way of appealing to future residents, to attract a talented, high-skilled workforce. For example, the Auckland Plan contends that liveability 'expresses our shared desire to create a city where all people can enjoy a high quality of life… which is attractive to mobile people, firms, and investors' (Auckland Council 2013). In this way, liveability temporarily avoids the politics of urban development but does not confront ongoing conflicts and trade-offs.
The politics of expertise and power negotiations between different professions are revealed in the way the discourse favours modes of quantification. Promotion of liveability rankings and indices developed by global media and consultancies placed these knowledge producers at the centre, reducing the relative influence of architects, planners, urban designers, engineers, psychologists and sociologists to speak authoritatively on cities. The work of urban designer and architect, Jan Gehl, was commissioned for the liveability agenda in Sydney and
Melbourne (McNeill 2011) , however, the potential for this expertise on urban environmental quality to address wider equity issues across the city was limited by local officials' framing, which negated the diversity of embodied urban experiences. While technical professions such as engineering and planning readily adopted liveability discourses to build value into their practice, the vague definitions proposed by liveability discourses limited its ability to influence technical design or planning practices. Liveability formed power at the juncture of discourse and expertise, reducing the legitimacy of other forms of knowledge. Liveability enabled a 'culture of expertise to emerge that is at odds with democracy through a separation of the forms of justification it deploys and the context of its application' (May 2017).
Production of powerful forms of expertise through liveability rankings disconnected knowledge production practices from the local context, thereby limiting opportunities for democratic input. What claims to be a people-centred approach to cities has privileged the preferences of a specific class of urban citizens -or rather, urban consumers. This paper, therefore, challenges the implicit assumptions of the urban liveability discourse and its underlying knowledge base. Liveability discourse and its expert knowledge are deficient in catering for the diverse needs of urban populations and in acknowledging the value of universal access to social goods such as housing, transport, energy, water and sanitation.
From urban liveability to urban livelihoods: reconnecting policy to everyday life in the city
Reviewing the framing effects of liveability discourse, its rhetoric and performative work, shows how discourse is vulnerable to appropriation by other, often agendas, even those that are contradictory. From the outset, liveability had the potential to frame urban policy problems in a way that dramatically improved quality of life and prioritised living standards within policy and planning. The term isn't inherently problematic, but the way it has been mobilised is where our primary critique is targeted. This review showed that the discourse followed a different trajectory, and the juncture between discursive framing and specific forms expert knowledge production was used tactically to appropriate liveability toward exclusionary agendas. Liveability thus became a form of powerful knowledge (Brenner and Schmid 2014; Kirby 2013): accepted wisdom on what cities should prioritise in policy and public investment. While improving quality of life for a city's residents is difficult to contest, the adopted definitions of liveability catered to wealthy, educated, cultural elites. Discourse framed urban liveability as a uniform, city-wide outcome, rather than reflecting the actual plural nature of individual experiences. Complementary to this, production of rankings and indicators aggregated data to the city level, eliminating opportunities to recognise difference 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 or inequality. The disconnect between liveability discourse, rankings, and the realities of individual experience drew critique and cynicism toward rankings and the value of liveability strategies (Jacobs 2015) . 
Engaging with the knowledge politics of urban liveability
Creating high quality, safe and sustainable urban environments for urban dwellers remains a laudable objective at a time where the majority of the world population -and increasingly so 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 As argued elsewhere: 'Especially in urban environments, every good idea can be co-opted by power, and the question we must begin asking is how we can become powerful enough to ourselves co-opt whatever concept can help -including creativity, entrepreneurialism, sustainability, resilience or freedom, all of which as ideas and aspirations could be quite useful' (Schafran 2014) . Liveability raises the same question. Its malleable nature also opens it up to broader discussions and new lines of thinking emanating from the lived experience and livelihoods of urban dwellers globally. In light of the debates reviewed in this paper, engaged academics can learn from the powerful combination of discourse and expert knowledge. The powerful performative qualities of this combination show that academics seeking to counter the hegemonic power of discourses such as liveability can build power through alternative forms of knowledge, and ways of knowing, that are compelling to urban practitioners, politicians and the public. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
